Last year I wrote about the difficulties inherent in organising healthcare services. Another industry with in-built instability is financial services. Several characteristics of this sector make it especially difficult to regulate effectively. I have explored some of these below.
Financial regulation is in a constant state of tension between two approaches. The ‘Laissez-faire’ (i.e. hands-off) approach advocates minimal interference, based on the assumption that the best interests of society are served through free markets. The alternate approach (‘interventionist’) suggests that free markets often act irrationally; they require close supervision and restrictions to avoid damaging financial crashes, amongst other problems.
The decision of where in the regulatory continuum between these two extremes a particular regulator should sit is fraught with difficulty. I’d like to draw attention to four particular problems.
1.) Complexity
Financial systems are full of feedback mechanisms that we don’t completely understand. The actions of millions of market participants combine to set asset prices, provide capital and transfer risks. What happens in the markets affects their behaviour, which in turn has an effect on the markets. George Soros calls the feedback patterns ‘reflexivity’ and blames the recent financial crisis on it.
Complexity in the markets might be seen as a good reason not to intervene, as regulators’ actions are liable to have ‘unintended consequences’. However it could also justify interventions which prevent increases in complexity (such as restrictions on derivative products). Regulatory rules may also help companies deal with the unexpected (such as capital requirements for banks). Market complexity is a double-edged sword that makes regulators’ jobs extremely difficult.
2.) Revolving Doors
The Oscar-winning documentary ‘Inside Job’ highlights how top roles in financial regulators are frequently filled by ex-bankers. This isn’t surprising, given the specialised knowledge these roles require. However it can reasonably cause concerns about conflicts of interest. Social ties, political contributions, and the ‘revolving doors’ between jobs in regulation, banking, and lobbying create strong disincentives to individual regulators taking hard line.
3.) Race to the Bottom
Financial services firms can base themselves where they like. As a result, some countries try to attract them by offering low regulatory burdens. The risk that firms will flee financial centres such as New York or London is a major disincentive to regulators in the US and UK from tightening up their supervisory regime.
4.) Financial Innovation
As Merton H. Miller explained in his 1986 paper on Financial Innovation, “the major impulses to successful financial innovations have come from regulations and taxes.” More specifically, financial institutions use new products as a way to get around regulatory restrictions, rendering them ineffective. (As an example, the US withholding tax on interest payments remitted abroad triggered the creation of the market for Eurobonds, to allow US firms to raise money outside of the US.) In addition, continuous financial innovation makes it extremely difficult for regulators to stay up-to-date with the latest financial instruments being created.
This is a very cursory treatment of a subject that could inspire whole volumes. I am sure I have missed out other important reasons behind the difficulty of regulating financial services. Ultimately, it will be the widespread recognition of these potential roadblocks to effective regulation that allows us to make progress overcoming them.
Showing posts with label Too Big To Fail. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Too Big To Fail. Show all posts
Tuesday, 12 July 2011
The Trouble with Financial Services: Why Regulators Fail
Wednesday, 22 June 2011
Too Big To Fail - The British Brains Behind the US Response to the 2008 Financial Crisis
I’ve recently read Andrew Ross Sorkin’s book on the Global Financial Crisis, “Too Big To Fail,” often described as the definitive account of how the events unfolded. It starts with the emergency rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008, then plots the series of decisions which ultimately led to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the takeover of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America and the bail-out of the banking system.
While I lived through these events and followed the press coverage eagerly at the time, the book sheds a fascinating light on the behind-the-scenes manoeuvring of the Wall Street CEOs and the government regulators. It has changed my perspective on some of the decisions that were made and reminded me of the magnitude of the task that was asked of the leaders in the banks, the regulators and the government.
One of the biggest changes in my view on the matter is a new-found respect for how effectively the British regulators reacted to the crisis, in comparison to their American counterparts. On a long list of issues, the British government and regulatory bodies took decisive action that the American regulators would not stomach – yet in many cases were later forced into copying.
- US regulators were strongly resistant to a ban on the short selling of financial companies’ shares, until they saw the positive effect it had in the UK.
- In the weekend before Lehman Brothers collapsed, Barclays was in negotiation to take it over. I didn’t realise before that this was blocked by the UK government. If a deal had gone through, Barclays could ultimately have been jeopardised, so it seems in hindsight to have been the right call.*
- In late 2008, when it became clear that wide-scale action was needed to help banks survive the write-downs on bad debts, the US government was planning to buy the poor-quality loans directly from the banks. This was the plan that was ‘sold’ to Congress. However, in practice it is barely workable – the government just does not know how much to pay for the loans. The solution was instead to make capital injections directly to the banks in exchange for an equity stake: the US chose this route after it had been successfully implemented in the UK.
- In a twist of irony, the UK bail-out was optional and several banks (including Barclays) were sufficiently strong they did not need to take government funds. In the US, which loathes government interference with ‘free enterprise,’ the top nine banks were forced to take bail-out funds (so that the weaker among them didn’t look bad).
The UK has a long history of showing leadership in the fields of economics and finance (I’m thinking in particular of the great economist J.M.Keynes). Reading this book made me realise that the UK still has an edge in these fields – one that will be required going forward as the country faces continuing challenges from fiscal tightening at home, the Eurozone debt crisis, and many other problems on the horizon.
Note
*Barclays later acquired the US broker-dealer unit of Lehman Brothers out of administration, getting the bit of the business they wanted at a knock-down price
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