Showing posts with label financial markets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label financial markets. Show all posts

Thursday, 31 December 2020

Value Creation and Value Capture: An Introduction and Simple Framework

The shift towards a digital, platform-based economy has major implications for how value is created in the economy and who captures that value. In my writing I regularly invoke these two concepts—value creation and value capture—but I realize that not everyone will be familiar with them.1 The concepts are well defined and are taught in many business schools. However, to newcomers to the field the terms might seem rather opaque. Given how central they are to thinking about economics, strategy, and entrepreneurship, I am writing this blog post to introduce the two concepts and offer a simple 2-by-2 framework that illustrates how I think about the relationship between the concepts and the distinctive domains of economics, entrepreneurship, and strategy. 

Value creation and value capture 

When we say that economic activity creates value, the “value” we are referring to is the sum of the benefits that flow to all the participants in the system. The “benefits” here are subjective and are sometimes referred to as “utility.” Economic transactions between buyers and sellers shed light on some of these benefits, but not all of it. When a consumer buys a product, we can infer that the consumer’s “willingness-to-pay” for the product (i.e. the utility they derive from it) is higher than the price they paid for the product—if it wasn’t, they wouldn’t have bought it! 

A useful metaphor for value creation is that it represents the size of the pie created by the actors (workers, entrepreneurs, managers, and consumers) undertaking some economic activity. The concept of value creation is very general and applicable at different scales: we can talk about the value created by a single transaction (which is the buyer’s willingness-to-pay minus certain costs related to the goods bought), the value created by a firm, the value created by an industry, or the value created by the entire economy. It is hard to know what a consumer’s “willingness-to-pay” for a product actually is, so when we wish to measure the “size” of the economy we fall back on measures that simply sum up all the transactions in the economy that represent end purchases of goods and services (one definition of Gross Domestic Product, GDP). 

If value creation is about determining the size of the pie, then value capture is about determining how the pie is divided. The price system is central to defining who captures value from a given economic transaction. When a consumer purchases a good, their value capture is defined as the difference between their willingness-to-pay and the price they paid (i.e. if they buy something they value a lot at a low price—hurray, a bargain!—they get more value capture). The seller’s value capture from the transaction will equal the price received minus some measure of the costs that went into providing the good (measuring those costs becomes complicated quickly, so I’ll set it aside in this blog post). Key here is that as long as the price is less than the buyer’s willingness-to-pay, the price doesn’t affect the total value created, it just affects the how much value is captured by each participant in the transaction. 

Are these just different labels for concepts I already know? 

Quite possibly. The field of business strategy uses the terms value creation and value capture to discuss managerial decisions about what a company should do. A common synonym for value capture is value appropriation. The two terms also have analogous concepts in the field of microeconomics: the total value creation in a system is sometimes referred to as social welfare. Economics also has labels for value captured by particular sets of actors: value captured by the consumers (or buyers) is consumer surplus and value captured by firms (or sellers) is producer surplus.2

Key concepts in value-based strategy

Pie-based metaphor

Alternative labels in strategy

Alternative labels in economics

Value creation

Size of pie
“How big is the pie?”

 

Social welfare

Value capture

Division of pie
“How big is each player’s slice of the pie?”

Value appropriation

Consumer surplus (size of buyer’s slice) and producer surplus (size of seller’s slice)

Economics, entrepreneurship, and strategy: A simple framework 

Drawing a conceptual distinction between value creation and value capture is surprisingly useful. In some economic activities, value creation and value capture are tightly coupled. For example, if I run bakery, I create value when I make a cupcake for a customer; I capture value when the customer pays me for the cupcake. However, in many important economic activities there is either a weak link—or no inherent link—between value creation and value capture. For example, basic research activity leads to novel scientific breakthroughs; product development activities invent useful new products and services. Both these have potential for enormous value creation. But the route to capture value from those activities is rarely obvious. That is why basic research is often funded by national governments through universities and research institutes: the “positive externalities” created by the new knowledge being widely distributed more than justifies the expenditure of public funds on the basic research.  

Research and innovation might create value without capturing it. On the flip side, there is a large set of activities in the economy directed toward capturing value, not creating it. Which activities fall into this set is hotly debated. One unambiguous example would be theft or fraud: illegal activity that simply transfers value from the victim to the fraudster is 100% about value capture (in fact, value creation is generally negative in these instances). A less clear-cut example is intermediation in the financial system. There is a strong argument that active mutual fund managers do not create value (as, on average, they do not outperform the market index) and yet they receive substantial management fees, thus they capture large quantities of value. Relatedly, high-frequency traders capture value by receiving information about large orders to buy or sell stock before other market participants and “front-running” those orders; it is hard to see any value creation in their activities. Critics of modern finance argue that it directs a huge portion of our collective intellectual capabilities towards value capture rather than value creation activities.  

Hence, I find it useful to think about value creation and value capture as two separable axes in a two-by-two matrix (see Figure 1). 

Figure 1: Value creation and value capture as separable dimensions

In the upper right quadrant, value creation and capture coincide; the upper left represents value creation without value capture; the lower right represents value capture without value creation.3 When I think of entrepreneurship, I think of the upper two quadrants: entrepreneurship is about finding new ways to create value for people. Not all entrepreneurship is directed toward making profit. Thus, much social entrepreneurship activity would fall into the upper left quadrant in the 2-by-2. When I think of economics, I mainly think of the right hand two quadrants. Economics is primarily about models of rational, self-interested actors—in other words, actors who care only about how much value they will capture. In economic models of firms, managers make decisions with a view to maximizing their firm’s profits.  

When I think of strategy as field of practice and research, it lies at intersection of value creation and value capture. Strategy, to me, is in the upper right quadrant in the 2-by-2. Strategic thinking is about understanding the interplay—the tension—between value creation and value capture. Competent strategists ought to understand both the economics of value capture and the entrepreneurial mechanisms that drive value creation.  

In conversations with (profit-oriented) founders about their business model, I probe both how they will create value and how they will (at some stage) capture some of it. Many entrepreneurs fixate on one or the other. Focusing narrowly on value creation may be a good starting point for a venture but scaling up the value creation takes resources (people, dollars, etc.) and those resource providers need to get something in return. Focusing narrowly on value capture leads some entrepreneurs to be overly cautious about discussing their ideas for fear they will be stolen. 

As you can tell, I could write at greater length on the interplay between value creation and value capture (and maybe in later blog posts I will!). I hope this acts as a helpful primer on two core concepts at the heart of entrepreneurial strategy. If more people comprehend the distinction, my hope is that more effort will be directed toward value creation, and less energy will be expended in the lower right quadrant where many talented people spend their days playing value capture games. 


Further reading 

My strong recommendation for reading more on this topic is Brandenburger and Nalebuff’s 1996 book Co-opetition. For a scholarly introduction to value-based strategy, see Brandenburger and Stuart’s article, “Value-Based Business Strategy.” If you are new to my blog, some related blog posts are here, here, and here.  

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 Footnotes 

1 My co-author Andy Wu and I recently published a Dialogue paper in the Academy of Management Review on the topic of AI and data-driven learning by platforms. Value capture is a central topic in that piece, so this blog post functions partly as a primer to that paper, and a complement to my other writings on value capture. 

2 In the latter part of this blog post I suggest that economics focuses on value capture. This is true of the assumptions that economists make about the actors in their models. But economists themselves also study whether policy interventions (such as taxes, subsidies, or regulations) can improve overall value created, i.e. social welfare. Economists care about value creation! They just assume that everyone else only cares about value capture. 

3 One could straightforwardly extend the matrix to a 3-by-2 where negative value creation (i.e. value destruction) is a new row in the Figure or a 3-by-3 where negative value capture (i.e. value subsidization) is a new column. Subsidization is an important element in platform strategy as it is often used to catalyze the adoption of new platforms and is sometimes also needed in the long run to retain the most valued side of platform joiners in a multi-sided market.


Thursday, 21 March 2013

72 Hours to Decide the Fate of Cyprus: Will it Go Down Like Lehman Brothers?

The financial crisis in Cyprus is presently at a critical juncture. Having rejected a tax on bank deposits early this week, the government needs to come up with another option for financing, or face a liquidity crisis in the next 72 hours that renders the country effectively bankrupt.

From here there are several things that could happen, of which I list three in the order of relative likelihood that I would assign them.

     1.) The Russian government contributes to a bailout

The reason for proposing the bank levy initially was that the EU and IMF are unwilling to completely bailout Cyprus themselves. The EU and IMF funding is structured as loans. Despite the fact that the extra sum required is small compared to bailouts in other Eurozone countries, the Cypriot economy cannot support any greater level of debt than is currently being planned. What is needed is more 'equity' rather than debt, either from a direct fiscal transfer, or an internal source such as a bank levy. 

A fiscal transfer would be untenable to the EU, and Germany in particular, for two reasons. Firstly, this would set up a 'moral hazard' problem, such that other countries lose the incentive to be financially responsible. The impetus for austerity measures in Greece and elsewhere would be severely weakened. Secondly, a key beneficiary of the transfer would be Russian depositors, who were outspoken opponents of the bank levy as originally proposed. A bailout that transfers EU funds directly to wealthy Russians is rather unpalatable, both ethically and politically.

This leaves the Russians themselves the most likely participants in a bailout agreement. It is their own citizens that stand to lose out from default, and the Russian leaders have already shown their solidarity with the depositors, even if they are using Cyprus as a tax haven.

     2.) A bank levy is reinstated on large deposits

Having observed the outcry at taxing deposits universally, the Cypriot leaders probably wish they had limited it to large deposits in the first place. It is far more politically palatable to place a windfall tax on the wealthy than on the poor. They even amended the proposed bank levy before the vote in parliament, but by that time it was too late as it had already lost all support. However, since Cyprus is so low on outside options, a resurrection of a tax on larger deposits is a real possibility.

     3.) Default

There are many commentators arguing that default will not be allowed to occur, and EU authorities will relent and cave in to a larger bailout. In my view, default is a very real possibility. I outlined above why the EU is unlikely to provide a direct fiscal transfer; such a transfer is beyond the remit of the IMF and anything less than an equity injection will leave the Cypriot banks insolvent. This means the European Central Bank will cease providing them with cash, and they will be bankrupt.

In this case the likely consequence would be a Cypriot exit from the Euro. The mechanics of how this might be conducted were closely examined in case it were needed in Greece. The banking system would be put on hiatus while the currency is switched to Cypriot Pounds. Bank assets and liabilities, including customers' deposits, would be re-denominated. The new Pounds would instantly depreciate against all the major currencies. Simultaneously the government would probably default on its external debts, either directly (by ceasing payments) or indirectly (by denominating the debts in Pounds and printing money, leading to hyper-inflation.) In short a lot of people would lose a lot of money, and they would end up wishing they had accepted the bank tax originally proposed.

From the perspective of the rest of the Eurozone, the great big unknown in this situation is the knock-on effects. 

A very good parallel here is the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy at the peak of the credit crunch in 2008. This was allowed to happen by the US authorities on precisely the 'moral hazard' grounds that make the EU reluctant to completely bail out Cyprus. The Lehman bankruptcy had devastating consequences, which were unanticipated largely due to the opaqueness and intrinsic complexity of connections in the financial system. Small details, like where assets were parked overnight, went on to have major ramifications as it led to different bankruptcy laws being applied. With a national economy we are faced with a whole different set of opaque connections, complex dynamics and ambiguous legal territory.

The EU leaders know all this, and yet may still allow it to happen. If nothing else (and assuming the Euro survives the contagion), a Cypriot exit would provide a test case for how a bigger Eurozone nation might later conduct an exit.

My thoughts go out to the leaders currently negotiating the future of a nation. I hope you bring us back from the edge.

Thursday, 19 July 2012

Oversupply, Collusion, or Petrodollars: What drives London's property market?

As a renter in London, I have a natural interest in the capital’s unusual property market. Rents in London seem decoupled from the rest of the country, 3 or 4 or 5 times as high, due to the demand created by London’s proximity to well-paid jobs. I don’t have much insight on which way the residential property market is going to go, but this fascinating article from Buttonwood at the Economist suggests UK house prices and rental rates are out of step and may be due for a correction.

One thing that has puzzled me is the resilient prices for commercial property. I haven’t found a good source of data on office rents but piecing together a few datapoints suggests rents have risen gradually and are apparently just 15% off their peak in 2008.

My insight on this comes from two simple observations. Firstly, there is a vast amount of vacant space in the City of London. Near my office in the Monument area there is a sparkling new development, The Walbrook Building, that has been vacant since it was completed in 2010. Streets near where I work and where I used to live in the East London area have a proliferation of empty space and ‘To Let’ signs.

Secondly, there is huge amount of new office space coming on to the market based on new completions. The Heron Tower in Bishopsgate, and St Botolph’s in Aldgate are ‘prime’ examples. The Shard, which opened this month in an impressive ceremony is the epitomy of this, with some reports suggesting barely any space in it is let. The Cheesegrater, the Pinnacle and the Walkie Talkie are all still under construction.

Sooner or later economics ought to catch up with this glut of new capacity and cause a crash in the commercial property market. One apt question, then, is why have prices remained resilient so far?

With respect to rents, I think this may be a case of weak competition. Most of the properties are owned and/or managed by a handful of developers (Land Securities, Canary Wharf Group, British Land) and property brokers (Knight Frank, CBRE, Cushman Wakefield, JLL, DJD). They each have such a large exposure to rental rates overall that they would rather let properties go vacant than let them at lower rates (the natural course of events in a competitive market).

With respect to capital prices, it is no secret that London property has become a magnet for foreign cash. Two of the highest profile developments (The Shard, Battersea Power Station) have backers from Qatar and Malaysia respectively (indeed, Qatar has also recently bought the Olympic Village, Credit Suisse HQ and Harrods.) These buyers are able make high bids for these assets because they have petrodollars which they need to recycle, on which they are willing to accept lower rates of return than other investors. It’s an interesting reversal of 20th century neocolonialism. While all this investment is superficially good for the UK economy, it has the effect of inflating property prices when arguably the economy would benefit from a correction. It also leaves prices vulnerable to capital flight, with the possibility of a full on crash (akin to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis).

Having made all these bold predictions I shall eagerly wait and see how things play out. In the meantime, I shall not be investing in commercial property in London any time soon!

Wednesday, 20 June 2012

When Genius Failed: LTCM and the Flawed Assumptions of Modern Finance

 
The story of Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that collapsed dramatically in 1998, is instructive to anyone with an interest in modern finance. Roger Lowenstein gives the definitive account of the rise and fall of LTCM in his book ‘When Genius Failed’, now part of the business-lit canon.

When it was founded in 1994 LTCM was notable for the outstanding pedigree of its partners, a mixture of experienced traders and renowned academics, including Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, two professors who helped invent option pricing theory and would later share a Nobel Prize. The premise was simple: they would identify small anomalies in bond prices, then make massively leveraged bets that the anomalies would disappear. Relying on economic theory and past data on market movements they could identify theoretical mis-pricing in the market and profit from the correction in market prices.

The fund initially made terrific returns, peaking in April 1998 with a 300% profit, a sum of over $4bn. Between that point and September 1998, the fund managed to lose a spectacular $4.5bn, reaching the point where its imminent bankruptcy threatened the whole financial system. How did such smart people lose so much money? Leverage and bad luck both played a part. But fundamentally the fund based its trades on the same assumptions that underlie much modern financial theory, assumptions that have repeatedly proved to be untrue. Here are three:

  1. Governments debt is ‘risk-free’
    Until recently it was expected that powerful governments would never default on their debt. This belief was eroded by various crises, and in the mid-nineties the conventional wisdom was only that nuclear powers would never default. LTCM expected this to hold and was seriously caught out when Russia stopped paying its creditors in 1998. Nowadays it is accepted that even developed nations may default (they have simply accumulated so much debt), but nevertheless the US Government is still considered a ‘risk-free’ borrower. The concept of the ‘risk-free rate
    ’ indeed lies at the heart of the equations used for investment decisions – so accepting that there is no such thing would require a new ‘relativistic’ framework at the heart of finance. With the US deficit out of control and its politics in paralysis, maybe the invention/adoption of a new framework is overdue.
     
  2. Markets are efficient, or tend towards being efficient*

    While it is generally accepted that markets stray from being efficient in the short run, many economists still believe that in the long run prices always converge with intrinsic values. Many investors, including LTCM, base their investment decisions on this assumption. In LTCM’s case, it served them well for several years – but backfired massively in 1998 when prices became more volatile than any of the ‘fundamentals’ would suggest they should have. Instead of cutting their losses when markets moved against them, the managers of LTCM were so confident that they increased their positions. The ‘Efficient Long-Run’ is a dangerous myth, and while many academics recognise this (and are working out why prices move irrationally) it is a myth that endures.
  3. Your trades do not move the market

    Finance theory is based on the perspective of a small investor whose individual actions do not affect market behaviour. One corollary of this is that there will always be a buyer for one’s assets, at the market price. LTCM was a long way from this theoretical ideal. With over $100bn in assets placed on a fairly small number of trades, it was like a whale in a swimming pool: the slightest move could make waves in the markets. It entered into trades so large that it could not exit them without prices in the market dropping. When liquidity in its markets (mostly exotic derivatives) dried up, it was left with no means of ‘cutting its losses’ on losing trades.
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Perhaps astoundingly, these assumptions are still widely believed and still guide much of the financial industry and government policy. The implosion of LTCM should have been a wake-up call, but instead it was patched up and things returned to business-as-usual, sowing the seeds for the 2008-09 financial crisis. Many prominent investors and academics have been openly questioning these assumptions for decades (Soros, Buffett, Stiglitz and Shiller to name a few) but as yet the core of the finance establishment is yet to change. Perhaps the absence of a convincing and functional alternative theory is holding back change? Perhaps, herein lies an opportunity to come up with something new?


*'Market Efficiency' is the idea that prices of assets reflect all available information about the current and future value of the asset and as a result all assets are properly priced (i.e. price = intrinsic value)

Thursday, 21 July 2011

How a Trip to the Pub Reminded Me, ‘There’s No Such Thing as a Free Lunch’

I’m always on the look-out for articles that educate, stimulate and generally challenge my view of the world. This week I found one in an unexpected place: the JD Wetherspoon pub chain’s company magazine. Sitting in the pub, leafing through the magazine, I was anticipating finding commentary on their latest pub openings and newest real ales. Instead I found myself reading an intelligent editorial piece on the troubles in the Eurozone by Tim Martin, Chairman of JD Wetherspoons.

While criticising the Euro is now in fashion due to the sovereign debt crisis, Tim Martin has long been opposed to the idea of the single European currency. He recounts in his article how he campaigned, in his capacity as a business leader, against its introduction in the UK. At the time, the accepted wisdom in intellectual circles was that the Euro would strengthen trade with Europe and would be an asset to the UK economy. He came up against politicians, economists and financial journalists all clamouring for its acceptance. But, along with hundreds of other citizens who rejected the idea of surrendering more powers to bureaucrats on the continent, he vocally rejected the Euro.

He characterises the debate over the Euro as pitting the intellectual elite, with their neoliberal economic agenda, against the ordinary citizen who values local freedoms (such as the control over our own currency) more highly than the theoretical benefits of global integration. And in the case of the Euro, his side appears to have won.

This got me thinking whether simple, unsophisticated, folk wisdom might triumph over complex theorising in other areas of business and finance. For example, how much management theory applies in real life? Do economic models include too many assumptions to really reflect reality? Is all the effort we spend making quantitative forecasts really much better going with your gut feeling?

One piece of folk wisdom that the world of business and finance would do well to learn from is “you can’t get something from nothing” (or, more familiarly, “there’s no such thing as a free lunch”). This simple maxim seems to have been forgotten in the pursuit of quick profits – but the profits prove illusory when the hidden costs are taken into account. For example, in business, switching to a cheaper supplier might seem like an easy win – but no switch comes without risks that might end up costing you. In finance, increasing your leverage is an easy way to flatter your return on equity – until a crunch arrives and you wind up with nothing. In economics, keeping interest rates low seems like an easy win in terms of stimulating the economy – but excess credit sows the seeds of the next bubble.

How the Eurozone debt crisis plays out will be fascinating and potentially terrifying to watch. As such, I am thankful to Tim Martin and others for opposing the Euro in the UK. And I am also grateful to him for reminding me that even the best theoretical ideas frequently fall flat on their faces when confronted by reality.

Tuesday, 12 July 2011

The Trouble with Financial Services: Why Regulators Fail

Last year I wrote about the difficulties inherent in organising healthcare services. Another industry with in-built instability is financial services. Several characteristics of this sector make it especially difficult to regulate effectively. I have explored some of these below.

Financial regulation is in a constant state of tension between two approaches. The ‘Laissez-faire’ (i.e. hands-off) approach advocates minimal interference, based on the assumption that the best interests of society are served through free markets. The alternate approach (‘interventionist’) suggests that free markets often act irrationally; they require close supervision and restrictions to avoid damaging financial crashes, amongst other problems.

The decision of where in the regulatory continuum between these two extremes a particular regulator should sit is fraught with difficulty. I’d like to draw attention to four particular problems.

1.) Complexity
Financial systems are full of feedback mechanisms that we don’t completely understand. The actions of millions of market participants combine to set asset prices, provide capital and transfer risks. What happens in the markets affects their behaviour, which in turn has an effect on the markets. George Soros calls the feedback patterns ‘reflexivity’ and blames the recent financial crisis on it.

Complexity in the markets might be seen as a good reason not to intervene, as regulators’ actions are liable to have ‘unintended consequences’. However it could also justify interventions which prevent increases in complexity (such as restrictions on derivative products). Regulatory rules may also help companies deal with the unexpected (such as capital requirements for banks). Market complexity is a double-edged sword that makes regulators’ jobs extremely difficult.

2.) Revolving Doors
The Oscar-winning documentary ‘Inside Job’ highlights how top roles in financial regulators are frequently filled by ex-bankers. This isn’t surprising, given the specialised knowledge these roles require. However it can reasonably cause concerns about conflicts of interest. Social ties, political contributions, and the ‘revolving doors’ between jobs in regulation, banking, and lobbying create strong disincentives to individual regulators taking hard line.

3.) Race to the Bottom
Financial services firms can base themselves where they like. As a result, some countries try to attract them by offering low regulatory burdens. The risk that firms will flee financial centres such as New York or London is a major disincentive to regulators in the US and UK from tightening up their supervisory regime.

4.) Financial Innovation
As Merton H. Miller explained in his 1986 paper on Financial Innovation, “the major impulses to successful financial innovations have come from regulations and taxes.” More specifically, financial institutions use new products as a way to get around regulatory restrictions, rendering them ineffective. (As an example, the US withholding tax on interest payments remitted abroad triggered the creation of the market for Eurobonds, to allow US firms to raise money outside of the US.) In addition, continuous financial innovation makes it extremely difficult for regulators to stay up-to-date with the latest financial instruments being created.

This is a very cursory treatment of a subject that could inspire whole volumes. I am sure I have missed out other important reasons behind the difficulty of regulating financial services. Ultimately, it will be the widespread recognition of these potential roadblocks to effective regulation that allows us to make progress overcoming them.

Sunday, 30 January 2011

The Search for Symmetry: How bankers' bonuses can set-up the wrong incentives

In my last post I described how the Scalability of transactions allows banks to pay large sums to attract the best people. But there is another feature of the bonus system that is equally fascinating, and goes some way to explain why banks suffered such massive losses in the 2008-09 financial crisis.

Bonuses are, by their nature, asymmetric. Employees get paid a base salary. Then those who perform particularly well may get a bonus on top. The ones who perform particularly poorly do not, as a rule, get a fine, or an ‘anti-bonus.’ The worst that can happen to them is they lose their jobs.

In non-financial jobs this asymmetry is not such a problem, as the contribution the employee makes to their company is also asymmetric. A great employee can create a lot of value for their firm, but a bad employee doesn’t destroy equivalent amounts of value. Take a law firm for example: highly productive associates may work lots of billable hours doing quality work. Their firm benefits from the work and pays them a large bonus to try and retain them. A poor associate, who works few billable hours and does poor quality work, will get no bonus, and may get the boot. But the poor performer is unlikely to lose the law firm a lot of money, as the work is quality-checked before it goes to a client – the deficiencies are noticed and rectified by the good performers.

However the financial sector, or more particularly the trading sector, doesn’t work this way. On investment banks’ trading desks, the banks’ own funds are put at risk by traders taking positions on the financial markets. If the desk makes a profit, the traders get a cut, which can lead to multi-million pound bonuses for ‘top performers’. However, if the desk makes a loss, the traders are not exposed to the downside. They may lose their jobs, but it is the bank that has to foot the millions or billions of pounds of losses. This asymmetry gives traders an incentive to make large and risky bets, whether or not they are the best thing for the investment bank’s bottom line.

This kind of behaviour is a key cause of trading scandals such as Jerome Kerviel’s €4.9bn loss at Société Générale. But moreover, it led to an accumulation of risky assets (such as securitised loans) on banks’ balance sheets, and helped sustain the over-valuation of these assets in the run up to the recent financial crash.

In the wake of the crash, banks and regulators are looking hard at how performance ought to be rewarded. Multi-year guaranteed signing-on bonuses for star performers are being phased out. More bonuses are being issued as restricted stock, which becomes worthless if a trader leaves the firm; this gives them a financial penalty if they lose their job, a kind of ‘anti-bonus’ if they perform particularly badly. Likewise with ‘clawback clauses’ that can retrospectively reduce a trader’s bonus if the positions they take turn out to make a loss in the long-term. These kinds of a reforms are a promising step in avoiding a repeat of the crisis; though they also add an element of the unknown and untried: I would not be surprised if the new set of incentives for bankers leads to some unintended consequences further down the line.

Thursday, 29 April 2010

Liquidity – at what cost?

Last week I read an interesting definition of arbitrage: "making money by buying and selling something without adding value." Those last three words began a train of thought that led to a conversation that led me to conclude that the world probably has too many arbitrageurs, and too many financial traders in general. Probably.

The primary purpose of financial instruments used to be for large companies to raise finance (through debt or through equity) and to hedge risk (through derivatives). Now it seems like their main purpose is to allow hedge fund managers and bank’s proprietary traders to make large profits.

In most industries, making a profit is achieved by adding value to some product or service and selling it at more than the cost of delivering it. The value added usually corresponds to a direct benefit for society – think of a baker turning flour into bread or a bike mechanic making a broken bicycle usable. One person’s effort allows them to earn a living while benefitting another person.

With the trading industry it is much harder to see who are the net beneficiaries - but they do exist. Speculators and arbitrageurs create liquid markets for financial instruments, which are important for companies to be able to raise finance with which to grow. Growth allows economies of scale, and public listings create a certain level of discipline amongst corporate management.

Having said this, I would argue that there are probably more people working in speculation and arbitrage than are required to make the financial markets liquid. The cost to society of the additional liquidity is that the people working as traders could have otherwise been adding value to society through industry or entrepreneurship. In this trade-off of the allocation of talent, there must be an optimal level of trading activity – enough to make financial markets work, without damaging other industries by sucking up too much brainpower – and I don’t think we are there.